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Abstract 
 
How do the president's calculations in achieving policy goals shape the allocation of cabinet 
portfolios? Despite the growing literature on presidential cabinet appointments, this question has 
barely been addressed. I argue that cabinet appointments are strongly affected not only by 
presidential incentives to effectively deliver their key policy commitments but also by their 
interest in having their administration maintain strong political leverage. Through an analysis of 
portfolio allocations in South Korea after democratization, I demonstrate that the posts wherein 
ministers can influence the government's overall reputation typically go to nonpartisan 
professionals ideologically aligned with presidents, while the posts wherein ministers can exert 
legislators' influence generally go to senior copartisans. My findings highlight a critical 
difference in presidential portfolio allocation from parliamentary democracies, where key posts 
tend to be reserved for senior parliamentarians from the ruling party.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: President, Presidential System, Minister, Cabinet Appointment, Portfolio Allocation, 
South Korea, East Asia 
1 
 
 
 
Existing research on cabinet formation in presidential systems has offered key insights on the 
chief executive's appointment strategy. According to the literature, presidents with limited policy 
making power tend to form a cabinet with more partisan ministers in order to reinforce support 
for their policy program (Amorim Neto 2006). When their party does not control a legislative 
majority, presidents are more likely to concede cabinet posts to opposition parties, thereby 
shoring up support for their policy agenda (Cheibub 2007; Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh 
2004). When institutional circumstances allow for effective control of their party, presidents are 
more likely to appoint copartisans versus nonpartisans to the cabinet in order to limit agency loss 
(Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015).  
While these studies provide important knowledge about the role of cabinet appointments 
in achieving policy goals, they fail to recognize that cabinet portfolios are not all equivalent; 
instead, different posts are better suited to advance particular goals.1
 In this article, I develop a theory that explains portfolio allocation as an instrument of 
presidents' efforts to fulfill their dual policy objectives, which often become a trade-off under the 
institutional separation of powers. As national leaders, presidents would like to appoint as many 
loyal and competent agents as possible to implement the policies promised in their electoral 
platforms; but as heads of government and party leaders,
 On the one hand, cabinet 
posts in key policy areas, such as economic management, directly determine the government's 
overall reputation; and on the other hand, positions in the policy areas represented by organized 
interest groups help to enhance the administration's governability. Existing research suggests that 
a variety of cabinet posts have been classified by the degree of their prestige or their gender type 
(Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Krook and O'Brien 2012), but little is known 
about how these posts can be categorized on the basis of a president's policy purposes.  
2  they also need to use cabinet 
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appointments to secure support from the legislature and the ruling party. Successfully balancing 
these incentives allows presidents not only to gain loyalty and expertise in key issue areas but 
also to benefit from legislators' experience and influence necessary to formulate and implement 
their program.  
 In light of this, how do presidents distribute cabinet portfolios to ministers for their policy 
goals? I argue that the posts wherein ministers can influence the government's overall reputation 
through the delivery of policy commitments in key issue areas are most likely to go to 
nonpartisan professionals who are ideologically aligned with presidents, while the posts wherein 
ministers can exert legislators' influence for the sake of the administration's governability in 
policy formulation and execution often go to senior legislators from the president's own party. 
These patterns are more likely to occur with an increase in the president's support in the 
legislature, because presidents can afford to strongly exert their preferences over portfolio 
allocation under such conditions. To test these claims, I use an original dataset on the 
composition of presidential cabinets in South Korea (henceforth Korea) between 1988 and 2013. 
I find strong support for this logic with multinomial logistic regression analyses.  
 Korea provides an excellent case for examining presidential portfolio allocations because 
we can systematically distinguish incentives to appoint nonpartisans versus party members to 
particular types of cabinet posts. Facing an assertive legislature and organized interest groups 
that have gradually constrained executive authority after democratization, Korean presidents are 
pressured to accommodate their interests in the government. Yet, parties in Korea are not as 
institutionalized as those in advanced democracies (Dalton, Shin and Chu 2008). To gain high 
levels of loyalty in implementing their important policy promises, presidents may appoint 
nonpartisan professionals whose policy preferences are compatible with them. In Korea, where 
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regional politics has historically functioned as a cue about a candidate's political views and 
beliefs (e.g., Kang 2003; You 2015), we are able to observe whether presidents have consistently 
allocated key cabinet posts to appointees who share their regional ties. In addition, focusing on 
presidents with constitutionally-mandated single five-year terms enables us to conduct an 
empirical analysis of portfolio allocation while controlling for country-level factors shaping 
presidential incentives.  
 In the next section, I first discuss a range of challenges faced by presidents of new 
democracies and focus on the two most important policy goals of every chief executive: building 
political support for their policy program and delivering their policy commitments to the public. 
Then I examine how the institutional separation of powers shapes presidential incentives to 
choose nonpartisan versus copartisan ministers. Given the nature of the trade-off, I further 
predict how presidents make portfolio allocations by distinguishing specific types of cabinet 
posts when appointing copartisans and nonpartisans and how the distinct patterns of portfolio 
allocation can change in crucial political contexts, such as the president's support in the 
legislature. 
 
President's Policy Goals, Portfolio Allocation, and Political Context 
Presidents of new democracies face a range of challenges and often address them with executive 
resources such as cabinet appointments (Amorim Neto 2006; Chaisty, Cheeseman and Power 
2012; Geddes 1994; Martinez-Gallardo 2012). On one hand, these challenges include generating 
broad legislative support for necessary reform program for the purpose of consolidating the 
institutions of democratic rule. With diverse issues threatening government stability, presidents 
will be pressured to compose their cabinets with representatives from a variety of political 
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persuasions and at least may attempt to secure sufficient legislative support for their leadership. 
On the other hand, presidents need to recruit policy experts who are reliable enough to put the 
president's program above individual political agenda. In other words, chief executives need 
executive agents that are administratively efficient and politically loyal. In presidential 
democracies, an executive's ability to keep his promises to the public is important in the eyes of 
the voters, and the presidential capacity to accomplish their policy agenda tends to be a necessary 
condition for a successful presidency (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). In sum, a presidential 
cabinet should reflect presidents' calculations regarding policy and political challenges they 
might face".3
 How would we expect presidential cabinets to be organized around their dual objectives? 
Understanding how presidents allocate specific types of cabinet portfolios to different ministers 
is more complicated than simply considering how the institutional separation of powers 
conditions presidential incentives to choose ministers, although I agree this is an important place 
to begin. Existing studies suggest that presidents face different incentives than prime ministers to 
appoint their party members to the cabinet due to the nature of the relationship formulated in a 
given constitutional design (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 
2015; Samuels and Shugart 2010; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2010). In parliamentary 
democracies, where a single chain of delegation links the voters' choice of parliamentary 
members to the formation of a government by the prime minister (Strøm 2000), the incentive to 
appoint copartisan ministers is compatible with parliamentarians' objective, because "party 
affiliation ensures that ministers share with the legislators who empowered them the aim of 
serving the party's electorate and delivering the party's policy commitments" (Schleiter and 
Morgan-Jones 2010, 1425).  
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 By contrast, in presidential democracies, where chief executives and legislators are 
elected by a different set of voters, appointing copartisan ministers may lead to divergent 
preferences over the direction of policy agenda (Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015; Samuels 
and Shugart 2010). While presidents serve a single national electorate and appeal to a broad 
voter group, their party may intend to serve more narrowly targeted interests for their local 
constituents. Partisan ministers therefore find themselves "subject to pressures to pursue the 
policy aims of two competing principals, the legislative party and the president" (Martínez-
Gallardo and Schleiter 2015, 236). On the other hand, by appointing nonpartisans, presidents can 
enjoy a high degree of ministerial loyalty. Nonpartisans are often chosen from the president's 
inner circle or a pool of candidates who are ideologically compatible with the president.4
 This leads to the question of how presidents will distribute specific cabinet portfolios to 
nonpartisans and copartisans. In general, the presidency is remembered in history for its 
performance and legacy in key policy areas, such as economic management, internal and foreign 
affairs, and national defense. These policy areas are described as "high" in the sense that they are 
"among the most visible and important responsibilities that a [president] has to manage while in 
government, and in which alleged failures by incumbents will form a key component of an 
 They 
often stay outside politics after serving as cabinet members (Blondel 1991). Moreover, by 
naming nonpartisans, presidents can recruit executive talent from an external pool and are not 
restricted by the limited talent available in party organizations in new democracies (Samuels and 
Shugart 2014). Nonpartisans are typically regarded as experts in their fields as they are often 
hired based on their professional backgrounds (Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015). In sum, the 
choice of nonpartisan cabinet ministers signals presidents’ commitment to effectively delivering 
their policy promises.  
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opposition case against the government" (Shugart, Pekkanen and Krauss 2013, 5; Escobar-
Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Krook and O'Brien 2012). Qualified candidates for the 
posts should be willing to put loyalty to the president's agenda above personal political interests 
and must be competent in the issue areas. In forming a cabinet, presidents will therefore delegate 
posts in "high-policy" areas to those who are most reliable and competent as they most directly 
determine the government's overall reputation. These posts are thus more likely to be given to 
nonpartisan professionals who are ideologically compatible with the president rather than to 
politicians whose preferences may differ from the president's policy agenda.  
 But, presidents also value the political leverage of their government, which complicates 
how their incentives can affect portfolio allocation. Cabinet appointments should therefore also 
reflect presidents' desire to shore up their support in the legislature or their own party. There are 
some policy areas where appointees' political backgrounds and experience are considered more 
important than other credentials, serving as "a marker for the legislator's power and influence" 
(Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss 2006, 187). When organized interest groups exist in the policy 
areas, presidents may name candidates who are perceived to represent their groups' interests or 
who can respond to these groups acting for the chief executive. In other cases, appointees are 
expected to coordinate between the executive and the legislative branches or the ruling party in 
order to facilitate the passage of the president's policy program. It therefore makes sense to 
delegate the exercise of legislators' influence that helps to enhance the administration's 
governability in policy formulation and implementation to senior politicians. These “political-
leverage” posts are likely to be granted to members of the president's party who have extensive 
experience with the legislature. It is also in the president's interest for future presidential 
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candidates in his party to develop the background necessary to successfully govern the executive 
branch.  
 In short, I suggest that current comparative studies analyzing the president's calculations 
in achieving policy goals generally overlook this important factor in explaining cabinet 
appointment – presidents value both the delivery of their key policy commitments and the 
maintenance of their administration's political leverage, and organize their cabinets to promote 
these dual objectives. Essentially, presidents face a trade-off between the two components: as 
national leaders, they may want to choose ministers beyond the party platform; yet, they also 
need their party members in the cabinet who can provide the connection between the legislative 
and the executive branches and help them to secure support from their own party (Martínez-
Gallardo and Schleiter 2015). Cabinet appointments should be therefore influenced by presidents’ 
desire to effectively deliver their policy promises, as well as by their interest in their 
administration maintaining strong political leverage.   
 
Portfolio Allocation under Political Context 
 
Portfolio allocation, however, does not operate in a vacuum but in specific contexts where 
presidential incentives can change significantly. In fact, presidents periodically reshuffle their 
cabinets, thereby adjusting to the variations in political and economic contexts during their terms 
(Lee forthcoming; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). Among a variety of circumstances that may 
shape these incentives, the president's support in the legislature has been shown to be one of the 
most influential aspects (Amorim Neto 2006; Cheibub 2007; Cox and Morgenstern 2001; 
Shugart and Mainwaring 1997), because it directly affects a president's political costs and 
benefits for appointing specific types of ministers to a post.  
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 Presidential effectiveness in lawmaking depends largely on their "abilities to shape or 
dominate the lawmaking process that stem from the president's standing vis-à-vis the party 
system" (Shugart and Mainwaring 1997, 13). When their party commands a legislative majority, 
presidents see their agenda more easily approved (Cox and Morgenstern 2001) and have weak 
incentives to seek additional political support. Presidents with strong legislative support have 
more leeway in distributing cabinet resources and so do not pay the cost of distributing scarce 
cabinet resources that they could concede to opposition parties for coalition formation when they 
allocate posts according to their preferences. On the other hand, when their party holds a 
legislative minority, presidents have stronger incentives to use cabinet appointments to build 
coalitional support for their program (Cheibub 2007). In this case, the benefit of forming a 
coalition is greater for presidents, and the cost of not bringing other parties into the cabinet can 
be high (Cheibub 2007; Pérez-Liñán 2007). Since presidents administering a minority 
government are more constrained to exert their preferences over portfolio allocation, we are less 
likely to see the portfolio allocation patterns depicted above.  
 Although my theory should be generally applicable to cabinet appointments in all 
presidential democracies, the specific application of this theory to young democracies provides 
an ideal opportunity to test it. For example, in young democracies, where parties are not as 
institutionalized, presidents tend to have limited capacity to hire executive talent within the party 
organization (Samuels and Shugart 2014). In this circumstance, I would expect presidents to rely 
on a talent pool outside the party to ensure the implementation of the key policies promised in 
their platforms while delegating authority to exert legislative influence to their party members. In 
addition, young democracies are typically characterized by more fragmented and immature party 
systems, which tend to be conducive to multipartism in the cabinet. In this context, presidential 
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incentives for cabinet appointments and coalition formation are more closely tied to the level of 
copartisan support in the legislature.  
 
Analyzing Presidents' Portfolio Allocations in Korea, 1988-2013 
Hypotheses 
My analysis focuses on executive portfolio allocations in Korea after its 1988 democratic 
transition. Korea is a useful case to examine how presidents in young democracies exercise their 
preferences over portfolio allocation in achieving policy goals, because presidents of Korea 
maintain nearly exclusive control over cabinet formation, including appointment and dismissal of 
cabinet ministers (Hahm, Jung and Lee 2013; Hicken and Kasuya 2003; Kang 2015; Shugart and 
Carey 1992). In Korea, appointing a prime minister requires legislative consent, but, even in this 
case, presidents still hold unilateral authority to dismiss her.5 Since appointing other ministers 
does not require legislative consent, and a prime minister cannot override presidential 
appointment decisions, Korean presidents have full discretionary power to select most cabinet 
members. Presidents usually determine specific post allocation in close consultation with their 
chief of staff in the Blue House.6 Even when negotiating with other parties in the legislature over 
potential coalition formation, presidents, rather than their parties, are the central decision makers. 
 According to scholars of the Korean presidential system, cabinet posts tend to be 
allocated along a separate track with particular types of ministries each featuring ministerial 
appointees with distinct characteristics (Park, Hahm and Jung 2003). Specifically, there are three 
types of ministerial party affiliation: members of the president's party, members of other parties, 
and members with no party affiliation (i.e., nonpartisans). I also divide the posts into three broad 
issue areas: those that have generally been in the most important policy areas (high-policy), those 
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concerning policy areas that are less salient but with organized interests (political-leverage), and 
those in the policy areas that are less salient and with dispersed interests (low-profile). The 
details of how each cabinet post is classified into three issue areas are discussed below.  
 How do presidential incentives for portfolio allocation vary among these types of posts? 
Based on my theoretical framework, the most significant distinction is between high-policy and 
political-leverage posts. While the former positions are linked to appointees' loyalty and 
professionalism, the latter are connected to their legislative experience. With regards to high-
policy posts, the choice of nonpartisans can fulfill this qualification. Nonpartisan ministers are 
most likely to be experts in their fields. In Korean cabinets, more than 80% of nonpartisan 
ministers are career civil servants or professors (Hahm, Jung and Lee 2013; Lee forthcoming). 
Nonpartisans are also easier to control because their appointments and dismissals are not tied to 
the cabinet's legislative support (Dowding and Dumont 2009). The appointment of nonpartisans 
can thus provide a variety of advantages for managing a president's platform in key policy areas. 
Therefore, my first prediction is that:  
 
Hypothesis 1: High-policy posts are more likely to go to nonpartisan ministers 
than political-leverage posts.  
 
 Although nonpartisans are generally perceived to be "selected to have incentives that 
coincide closely with the president's goal" (Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015, 237), it is 
important to note the varying extent to which their political beliefs and policy preferences differ 
from the president's. As noted above, in the Korean context, one way to judge this ideological 
compatibility is whether appointees and presidents have common regional ties. Often, ministers 
who receive high-policy posts are selected from the president's inner circle which is formed 
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based on such criteria as mutual biographical, educational, or familial backgrounds.7
 
 Thus, my 
second hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 2: Nonpartisan ministers who have common regional ties with the 
president are more likely to receive high-policy posts than those who do not.  
 
 
 Likewise, with respect to political-leverage posts, the representation of the president's 
party members in the cabinet can help to fulfill the president's desire to maintain strong political 
leverage in the government. Scholars have argued that presidents are motivated to appoint 
copartisan ministers in order to strengthen the support of their own party and improve 
effectiveness in implementing their program (Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015; Taylor, 
Botero and Crisp 2008). Specifically, by assigning political-leverage posts to their party 
members, presidents can connect the legislative and the executive branches while helping their 
copartisans to leave respectable footprints in policy making and implementation.8
 
 In Korean 
cabinets, copartisan ministers have, on average, 9.5 years of experience in the National 
Assembly. It is also reasonable to predict that copartisan ministers who have greater experience 
with the legislature are more likely to receive these posts than those who are political novices. 
Therefore, my third and fourth hypotheses are:  
Hypothesis 3: Political-leverage posts are more likely to go to copartisan ministers 
than high-policy posts.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Copartisan ministers with greater experience in the legislature are 
more likely to receive political-leverage posts than those who are not.  
 
 An evaluation of the political context in presidential democracies further suggests two 
additional hypotheses. As an element that shapes presidential incentives for cabinet appointments 
and coalition formation, the president's support in the legislature directly affects a president's 
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political costs and benefits for appointing specific types of ministers to a post. When their party 
is weak in the legislature, presidents have stronger incentives to build coalitional support, and the 
benefit of forming a coalition can be greater. As their party becomes stronger in the legislature, 
however, presidents have weaker incentives to concede cabinet resources to opposition parties 
for coalition formation. In this case, presidents can strongly exercise their preferences over 
portfolio allocation, because they are not likely to pay the cost of doing so by not bringing other 
parties into the cabinet. This forms the basis of my fifth and six hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 5: As the president's support in the legislature increases, high-policy 
posts are more likely to go to nonpartisan ministers than political-leverage posts. 
 
Hypothesis 6: As the president's support in the legislature increases, political-
leverage posts are more likely to go to copartisan ministers than high-policy posts. 
 
 Even when presidents who have weak support in the legislature are strongly motivated to 
form a coalition, I expect that they will give posts to members of other parties, likely in low-
profile issue areas rather than key policy areas. Presidential cabinets would be irrationally 
organized if chief executives gave prime seats to other party members without regard to 
calculating the costs of doing so. In multiparty systems, small parties that cannot usually contend 
for the office of the chief executive are also likely to accept the proposed posts. With no better 
option, they are better off doing so and accessing executive resources than staying outside 
government and receiving nothing (Samuels 2002).  
 
Data  
In my empirical analysis, I test the six hypotheses presented in the previous section using an 
original dataset on the composition of Korean cabinets from 1988 to 2013. The dataset contains 
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467 observations (ministers) across five presidential administrations and updates but differs from 
the Korean Ministerial Database constructed by Hahm, Jung, and Lee (2013) in that it includes 
political profiles of all ministers such as party affiliation, has information about contexts, and 
covers a more recent time period (2008-2013).9
 My major dependent variables are types of ministers concerning their party affiliation. As 
described above, there are three types of ministers in Korean presidential cabinets: copartisan, 
other partisan, and nonpartisan ministers. A large majority (67.7%) of ministers are nonpartisan; 
28.3% of my observations are from the president's party; and 4% of my observations are from 
legislative parties other than the president's.  
 Changes in cabinet formation frequently occur 
during the presidential terms in Korea, and 49.3% of the ministers in my sample served less than 
a year. However, 11.3% of the ministers in my sample were retained within or across 
administrations through holding multiple positions in the cabinet.  
 My key independent variables are types of cabinet portfolios and the president's support 
in the legislature. As briefly discussed above, there are three types of portfolios: high-policy, 
political-leverage, and low-profile. First, high-policy positions involve the most important policy 
areas and the salient responsibilities that the chief executive has to effectively manage while in 
office (Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss 2006; Shugart, Pekkanen and Krauss 2013). These policy 
areas concern economic management, foreign affairs, national defense, internal affairs, and legal 
affairs.10 Often, these posts are occupied by career professionals from the same field.11 In my 
dataset, 93.8% of foreign affairs ministers are former diplomats, 94.4% of defense ministers are 
former military generals, and 87.5% of justice ministers are former legal experts such as 
prosecutors, judges, or attorneys.  
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 Second, political-leverage posts cover policy areas where organized interests exist or the 
nature of the duties requires skills to coordinate with the legislature (Park, Hahm and Jung 2003). 
To categorize specific posts into this group, I used multiple sources including personal 
interviews with ministers as well as academic publications, news reports, and websites. 12  I 
anticipated that these posts would go to senior legislators from the president's party. Consider the 
example of President Kim Young-sam. In 1993, when Kim took office as the first civilian 
president of democratized Korea, he foresaw labor unions' strong demand for the improvement 
of workers' rights. Facing these expected challenges during the democratic transition period, 
Kim's choice of Labor Minister was Lee In-je, an incumbent legislator from his Democratic 
Liberal Party (DLP). Lee was a member of the Committee on Labor and Employment in the 
National Assembly and later contributed to the Kim administration by instituting a national 
unemployment insurance system.13
 Third, low-profile positions include policy areas that are less salient and tend to be 
represented by dispersed interests (Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss 2006). I group all posts that 
are neither high-policy nor political-leverage into this category. When necessary, presidents 
would distribute these posts to coalition members in exchange for their legislative support, 
mainly due to the low costs of conceding the posts to members of other parties. Consider the 
formation of a coalition government by President Kim Dae-jung. In 1998, when Kim and his 
legislative party, the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP), formed a coalition with the 
conservative United Liberal Democrats (ULD), he allocated a part of relatively low-profile 
cabinet seats, including Science and Technology, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Industry and 
Energy, and Construction and Transportation posts, to his coalition partner.
 In my dataset, 79.3% of Political Affairs Ministers, 50% of 
Labor Ministers, and 42.9% of Health and Welfare Ministers are from the president's party.  
14  
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 Another main independent variable is the president's support in the legislature. To 
measure this variable, I use the size of the president's party in the legislature, which is the 
proportion of seats occupied by the president's party in the Korean National Assembly. In 
addition, for further analysis concerning ministers' backgrounds in models shown in Table 3, I 
include a set of variables characterizing ministers' biographical, educational, and political 
backgrounds: age (in years), gender (1 if ministers are female, otherwise 0), hometown (1 if 
ministers are from the same hometown with a president's, otherwise 0), education (1 if ministers 
have a bachelor's as the highest degree, 2 if ministers have a master's as the highest degree, and 3 
if ministers have a doctoral degree), and legislative experience (the length of service as a 
member of the National Assembly in years). 
 I also control for five variables associated with political and economic contexts, which 
may affect presidential incentives for portfolio allocation. The first variable is a measure of 
legislative fragmentation. For this measure, I adopt the effective number of legislative parties, 
the index created by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), which gives a higher value for a more 
fragmented legislature. Facing more fragmented legislatures, presidents may have stronger 
incentives to form a coalition and are thus more likely to concede cabinet posts to members of 
other parties (Cheibub 2007). The second variable is a measure of the electoral cycle, which is 
the number of months left until the end of a president's term. I include this variable because the 
dynamics of cabinet politics tend to vary with the fixed electoral calendar and shift over the 
course of the president's term (Altman 2000). The third variable is a measure of economic crisis. 
As observed during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, presidents tend to rely on the expertise of 
technocrats in response to economic hardship. To address this possibility, I use the monthly 
change in the consumer price index as a proxy measure. Note that this measure is based on the 
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estimation of the moving average of three months before portfolios were allocated in order to 
smooth the monthly variation and capture its lagging impact (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; 
Martínez-Gallardo 2012). The fourth variable is a measure of an age of democracy, which is the 
number of years since the country’s democratic transition. I account for this variable because 
new democracies with an immature party system may be "more conducive to non-partisanship in 
the cabinet" (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006, 639). The last variable is a measure of the 
magnitude of cabinet reshuffling, which is the proportion of cabinet seats replaced at the time of 
new appointments. This variable may positively or negatively affect specific allocation patterns 
due to the nature of cabinet reform. All models also include a set of dummy variables for the 
presidential administration due to possible baseline differences in presidents' propensities for 
portfolio allocations. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all independent and control 
variables.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables 
 
Results  
I begin my analysis by estimating the likelihood of each minister type holding three different 
types of posts. For this analysis, I employ multinomial logistic regression models with 
administration-level fixed effects. Given that there are three categories of the dependent variable 
that are not ordinal, multinomial logistic regression is the appropriate analytical tool. Based on 
my first four hypotheses, the most significant distinction in minister type is between nonpartisans 
and copartisans. Therefore, for the dependent variables, my baseline categories are copartisans in 
Models 1 and 2 and nonpartisans in Models 3 and 4. Hypothesis 1 suggests that high-policy posts 
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should be more likely to go to nonpartisan ministers than political-leverage posts, so the 
coefficient on high-policy should be positive (Model 1). Hypothesis 3 suggests that political-
leverage posts should be more likely to go to copartisan ministers than high-policy posts, so the 
coefficient on political-leverage should be positive (Model 3). Hypotheses 5 and 6 suggest that 
the likelihood of high-policy and political-leverage posts being allocated to nonpartisan and 
copartisan ministers, respectively, should be higher with an increase in the president's support in 
the legislature. Therefore, I predict positive signs for the interaction term between high-policy 
and legislative support (Model 2) and the interaction term between political-leverage and 
legislative support (Model 4). In addition, with a nonpartisan minister as the baseline category of 
the dependent variable in Model 5, I expect the coefficient on low-profile to be positive as low-
profile posts should be more likely to be go to ministers of other parties than high-policy posts. 
Table 2 presents the results analyzing the effects of portfolio type on the likelihood of being 
allocated to the three types of ministers. Specific results are discussed below.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] Table 2 Multinomial Logit Analysis of Policy Area of Post, Political 
Context, and Minister Type 
 
Notes: Dependent variables: 1 if minister is nonpartisan, copartisan or other partisan.  
Baseline categories: political-leverage or high-policy post, Roh Tae-woo administration. Robust standard errors 
clustered on administration in parentheses.  
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
 The evidence from Table 2 is consistent with my hypotheses and lends strong support for 
my argument that the president's portfolio allocations vary according to specific considerations 
concerning policy objectives. First, as suggested in Hypothesis 1, high-policy posts are 
significantly more likely to go to nonpartisan ministers than political-leverage posts (1.340, p 
< .01, Model 1). Using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003), I estimate that nonpartisan 
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ministers are 9.4% more likely to be assigned high-policy posts than political-leverage posts, 
holding all other variables constant.15 Nonpartisan ministers are in fact the most likely to hold 
low-profile posts (1.688), but the margin (10.7%) is not considerably different. 16
 Historically, since the country's democratic transition, economic and administrative 
reforms have been an important part of Korean presidents' agendas. Through the recruitment of 
ideologically compatible professionals, cabinet appointments have positive implications for 
presidents who seek to accomplish responsiveness and competence in the administration. 
Including Kim Young-sam's adoption of major economic reforms for deregulation and 
privatization as the first civilian president (see Baum 2007), Korean presidents handily delegated 
the delivery of policy commitments to professional ministers such as career civil servants, taking 
advantage of their expertise and experience in relevant policy areas. Particularly in key policy 
areas, such as economic management, foreign affairs, national defense, and legal affairs, 
presidents could expect ministers with professional backgrounds to efficiently control highly 
trained personnel groups in the bureaucratic organization.
 Second, as 
suggested in Hypothesis 3, political-leverage posts are significantly more likely to go to 
copartisan ministers than high-policy posts (1.340, p < .01, Model 3). Substantively, copartisan 
ministers have a 9.7% higher likelihood of holding political-leverage posts than high-policy 
posts. In addition, the result in Model 5 indicates that low-profile posts are more likely to be 
assigned to ministers of other parties than high-policy posts (0.658, p < .05, 1.7%).  
17
 Table 2 also reports the results of how the patterns of portfolio allocation, presented in 
Models 1 and 3, are mediated by important political contexts such as the president's support in 
the legislature. In Model 2, the coefficient on the interaction term between high-policy and 
legislative support is positive (5.033) and statistically significant (p < .01), indicating that the 
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likelihood of allocating high-policy vis-à-vis political-leverage posts to nonpartisan ministers 
becomes greater as the president's support in the legislature increases (H5). This is clearly 
illustrated in Figure 1 (1.1), which shows the marginal effect of a high-policy post on the 
predicted probability of being assigned to nonpartisans across the president's support in the 
legislature. Based on the estimation of Model 2, an increase in the president's support in the 
legislature from its observed mean to maximum values leads to a considerably increased 
probability of nonpartisan ministers' appointments to a high-policy post: from 21.9% to 38.7%. 
At the observed mean value of legislative support, nonpartisan ministers have a 21.9% higher 
likelihood of receiving a high-policy post than a political-leverage post, but this likelihood rises 
up to 38.7% at the observed maximum value of legislative support.  
 Similarly, in Model 4, the coefficient on the interaction term between political-leverage 
and legislative support is positive (5.033) and significant (p < .01), indicating that the likelihood 
of allocating political-leverage vis-à-vis high-policy posts to copartisan ministers becomes higher 
as the president's support in the legislature increases (H6). The power of this interaction effect is 
graphically described in Figure 1 (1.2), which demonstrates the marginal effect of a political-
leverage post on the predicted probability of being assigned to copartisans. Based on the 
estimation of Model 4, an increase in the president's legislative support from its observed mean 
to maximum values leads to a substantially heightened probability of copartisan ministers' 
appointments to a political-leverage post: from 20.7% to 44%. Copartisan ministers have a 20.7% 
higher likelihood of receiving a political-leverage post than a high-policy post at the observed 
mean value of legislative support, but this probability becomes as high as 44% at the observed 
maximum value of legislative support. In sum, these findings confirm that the patterns of 
portfolio allocation, presented in Models 1 and 3, are more likely to occur with an increase in the 
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president's support in the legislature, because presidents can strongly exercise their preferences 
over portfolio allocation in such contexts.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] Figure 1 Marginal Effect of High-policy and Political-leverage Posts and 
Predicted Probability of Nonpartisan and Copartisan Appointments 
 
Note: dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals.  
 
 
 
 The results of the control variables suggest interesting implications, but only a few of the 
coefficients reach statistical significance. The coefficient on legislative fragmentation is negative 
and statistically significant in Models 1 and 2, whereas it is positive and statistically significant 
in the remaining models. A more fragmented legislature clearly reduces the likelihood of 
nonpartisan appointments and largely enhances the probability of partisan appointments. 
Consistent with the literature, presidential incentives for coalition formation increase with the 
degree of legislative fragmentation (Cheibub 2007), and copartisan appointments are also likely 
to increase in such context.  
 The results in Table 2 are based on the probability of three different types of posts being 
allocated to each minister type. However, the logic behind my hypotheses is more specific 
concerning ministers' backgrounds. Hypothesis 2 suggests that nonpartisan ministers who have 
common regional ties with the president should be more likely to receive high-policy posts than 
those who do not. Hypothesis 4 suggests that copartisan ministers with greater experience in the 
legislature should be more likely to receive political-leverage posts than those who are not. 
Therefore, I further analyze the likelihood of individual ministers with different backgrounds 
being appointed to specific types of posts. I use logistic regression models with administration-
level fixed effects for this analysis. Table 3 presents the results of logistic regression analyzing 
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the effects of ministers' backgrounds on the likelihood of holding two different types of 
portfolios: high-policy and political-leverage posts. Models 1 and 3 report all types of ministers. 
Models 2 and 4 include only nonpartisan and copartisan ministers, respectively.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] Table 3 Logit Analysis of Ministers' Backgrounds and Policy Area of Post 
Notes: Dependent variables: 1 if minister holds a high-policy or a political-leverage post.  
Baseline category: Roh Tae-woo administration. Robust standard errors clustered on administration  in parentheses.  
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
 The evidence from Table 3 is consistent with the logic underlying Hypotheses 2 and 4. 
Indeed, ministers' backgrounds are a proven key consideration in the president's portfolio 
allocations, which is in line with existing research on ministerial appointments in Korea (Hahm, 
Jung and Lee 2013; Park, Hahm and Jung 2003). First, as suggested in Hypothesis 2, nonpartisan 
ministers are more likely to receive a high-policy post when they share regional ties with the 
president. In Model 2, nonpartisans who have common regional ties with the president are more 
likely (by one additional percentage point) to be appointed to a high-policy post than those who 
do not, holding all other variables constant.18
 Second, the coefficient on legislative experience is positive and statistically significant in 
Model 3, which suggests that ministers with greater experience in the legislature are more likely 
 The coefficient on hometown holds positive and 
statistically significant even among the whole set of observations (Model 1), which suggests that 
a shared geographical background is generally used to judge candidates' ideological propensity 
regarding important policy areas in the context of Korean politics. In a multi-step process where 
the president reviews "whether a candidate's political beliefs and policy preferences fall in the 
acceptable range" (Lee, Moon, and Hahm 2010, 82S), such cues can help presidents choose 
nominees whose political ideology and policy positions are compatible with theirs. 
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to receive a political-leverage post than those who are not. Holding all other variables equal,19 
ministers have a 21.5% higher likelihood of holding a political-leverage post when their 
experience with the legislature increases from its observed mean to maximum values. The 
coefficient, however, remains positive but turns insignificant exclusively among a total of 132 
copartisan ministers (Model 4). The results suggest that ministers with extensive legislative 
experience have a clear advantage for receiving a political-leverage post when compared with 
the overall pool of ministers, but once co-partisanship is accounted for, this advantage seems 
minimal. Nonetheless, this finding may not be so surprising because presidents sometimes grant 
this type of post to young and ambitious party members who can be future presidential 
candidates.20
 The results of the other background variables also offer interesting implications. The 
coefficient on gender is positive and statistically significant in Models 3 and 4, but it is negative 
and significant in Model 1. The finding that women ministers are less likely to receive key 
cabinet posts and more likely to hold less important posts is consistent with existing research on 
presidential cabinets in the Latin American context (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 
2009). The coefficient on age is positive and statistically significant in Model 1 but negative and 
significant in Model 3. These results suggest differences in the individual characteristics of 
ministers who receive high-policy and political-leverage posts. Senior ministers with extensive 
experience in their fields are more likely to hold the former, while younger and politically 
ambitious ministers are more likely to hold the latter. The coefficient on education is negative 
and statistically significant in Models 1 and 2. Appointees' academic training and knowledge 
should be important in choosing ministers, but educational qualifications may not be a top 
priority in assigning key cabinet posts. While the control variables such as electoral cycle, 
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economic crisis, and age of democracy also seem to be negatively associated with the likelihood 
of portfolio assignments, these variables perform inconsistently across model specifications.  
 
Conclusion 
The president's calculations in achieving policy goals are central to the allocation of cabinet 
portfolios in presidential systems. In this paper, I have demonstrated how the distribution of 
cabinet appointments is systematically affected by presidential incentives to accomplish their 
goals in the government: Korean presidents are strategic in their assignment of posts by treating 
ministers differently based on their party affiliation. Presidents allocate positions in key policy 
areas to ideologically compatible nonpartisan professionals in an effort to keep their promises to 
the public in such issue areas, but also reserve seats for their party members so that these 
politicians can exert legislative influence on their behalf. This allows presidents not only to 
promote the government's general reputation through the delivery of their important policy 
commitments as national leaders, but also, as heads of government and party leaders, to shore up 
the cabinet's legislative support and grease the wheels in the governing process.  
 Moreover, my findings also suggest that portfolio allocation responds to the incentives of 
crucial political contexts such as the president's support in the legislature. As demonstrated in 
previous studies (Amorim Neto 2006; Cheibub 2007, Cox and Morgenstern 2001; Shugart and 
Mainwaring 1997), legislative support from their own party becomes an important source of 
institutional leverage for presidents in the policy making and cabinet appointment processes. 
When their party gains legislative seats, presidents can afford to strongly exert their preferences 
over portfolio allocation, and we are thus more likely to observe the distinct patterns of portfolio 
allocation to nonpartisans and copartisans, as described above. Beyond simply observing that 
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particular categories of executive offices are disproportionately allocated to ministers based on 
their partisanship, we see that presidents structure their distribution of cabinet posts, adjusting to 
various political contexts.  
 My findings on portfolio allocation speak to the recent literature on the effects of the 
institutional separation of powers and provide new evidence about the behavioral aspect of 
cabinet formation. The comparative research on cabinet formation in presidential systems 
acknowledges policy making incentives as main drives to practice different appointment 
strategies (Amorim Neto 2006; Cheibub 2007, Geddes 1994; Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 
2015). Yet, how ministers are selected to fill certain cabinet posts depending on their 
partisanship and the way these patterns reflect different forms of governing incentives are largely 
overlooked. I show that the observed patterns of portfolio allocation mirror presidential efforts to 
achieve their policy goals given a trade-off they face under the institutional separation of powers.  
 These patterns highlight the difference from portfolio allocations in parliamentary 
systems, particularly to the chief executive's party members. In parliamentary democracies where 
the incentive of appointing copartisan ministers is compatible with parliamentarians' aim 
(Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2010), electoral incentives matter considerably in post allocation. 
The ruling party's electoral success should thus be central to the allocation of ministerial 
portfolios in parliamentary systems. Typically, key policy posts go to the most senior and secure 
parliamentary members from the ruling party, who then may focus on developing and 
maintaining a strong party label (Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss 2006). In contrast, in 
presidential democracies, these posts can be assigned to a president's most reliable agents even at 
the expense of the importance of their party organization.  
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 In analyzing the systematic relationship between ministers and portfolio types, future 
work should seek to expand the period of observation as well as the number of cases in order to 
understand the impact of institutional factors, such as party system institutionalization, 
constitutional powers, and term limits, on the patterns of portfolio allocation, particularly in key 
policy areas.21
 My analysis makes significant contributions to increasing our understanding of portfolio 
allocation as a policy-making strategy in South Korea. The findings have the possibility to travel 
beyond East Asia and also have important implications for the quality of governance and 
representation in young democracies. Given evidence from my analysis, further research can find 
out how such patterns of personnel distribution influence the kind of policies political leaders 
adopt and the level of accountability and responsiveness to constituents these policies represent. 
The fact that presidents strategically structure their portfolio allocations according to particular, 
institutionally-driven concerns and thus adapt to variations in political contexts also suggests the 
important impact such contexts may have on the qualities of policy making and representation in 
presidential democracies.  
 Recent research casts some light on the linkage between the centralization of the 
party organization and an increase in copartisan appointments (Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 
2015). However, the question of whether there is any difference in portfolio allocation with the 
institutionalization of political parties and party systems is largely unexplored. Since party labels 
play a central role in providing cues about a candidate's political views in institutionalized party 
systems, old cleavages in young democracies, such as regionalism in Korea, will be replaced by 
new cleavages, represented by party organizations, as democracies mature. In such contexts, the 
president's party members should become more prevalent in key policy positions as evidenced by 
the U.S.  
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Endnotes 
 
                                                          
1 For portfolio allocation in parliamentary systems, see Thies (2001). He finds that junior ministers are often from 
different coalition parties than senior ministers in order to increase accountability in given policy areas. 
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2 In presidential systems, presidents typically serve as de facto party leaders in the governmental arena without 
regard to their formal party leadership (Cheibub 2007; Samuels 2002). 
3 These goals might not exhaust important political objectives that presidents are supposed to embrace in their 
cabinets. One of the most typically and widely sought political objectives is representation in the government. For 
example, decision-makers pursue harmony in the cabinet by appointing cabinet members from diverse political and 
regional backgrounds (Interview, Presidential Chief of Staff and Minister of Employment and Labor Yim Tae-hee, 
Korea, August 21, 2013). In this article, however, I contend as presidents' key objectives that chief executives 
generally want to have their government and necessary reform program broadly supported by the legislature and 
their agenda well implemented in the executive through cabinet appointments. 
4 See Nathan (1983), Wilson (1989), and Weingast (2005) for discussion of "administrative loyalists". 
5 Interview, Prime Minister Kim Seok-su, Korea, August 16, 2013. 
6 Interview, Presidential Chief of Staff and Minister of Employment and Labor Yim Tae-hee, Korea, August 21, 
2013. 
7 Interview, Minister Choo Byung-jik of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation, Korea, September 13, 
2013. 
8 Interview, Yim Tae-hee, Korea, August 21, 2013. 
9 I use the CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments and the Political 
Handbook of the World as main sources.  
10 In the Korean context, a prime minister position is also included in this category. 
11 Interview, Minister Song Min-soon of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Korea, September 16, 2013. 
12 In Korea, these policy areas concern labor, healthcare and welfare, environment, political affairs, and culture, 
sports, and tourism (see e.g., Park 2006). 
13 Interview, Minister of Labor and National Assemblyman Lee In-je, Korea, September 12, 2013. 
14 Low-profile posts also include Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Gender Equality and Family, Information and 
Communication, Public Information, and Unification.  
15 All predicted probabilities reported on the results in Table 2 are computed using Clarify simulations holding all 
control variables constant at their median values and assuming ministers from the Roh Tae-woo administration 
unless otherwise specified. 
16 Nonpartisans are individuals with diverse backgrounds (Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015), and future research may 
unpack which types of nonpartisan ministers are more likely to receive high-policy versus low-profile posts. 
17 Interview, Choo Byung-jik, Korea, September 13, 2013; Interview, Song Min-soon, Korea, September 16, 2013.  
18 A median minister is a 57 year-old male minister with a doctoral degree and no legislative experience. 
19 A median minister is a 57 year-old male minister with a master's degree, who is not from the president's 
hometown. 
20 Interview, Lee In-je, Korea, September 12, 2013.  
21  Future research may unravel whether the logic of the argument made here applies to other presidential 
democracies in East Asia or Latin America where there are variations in term limits (single-term limited vs. re-
electable) and presidential constitutional powers (strong vs. weak).  
 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables 
Variables N Mean SD Min Max 
Independent Variables      High-policy  467 0.287 0.453 0 1 
Political-leverage 467 0.274 0.447 0 1 
Low-profile 467 0.413 0.493 0 1 
Legislative support 467 0.497 0.128 0.154 0.729 
Backgrounds      Hometown 467 0.214 0.411 0 1 
Legislative experience 467 3.01 5.35 0 32 
Age 467 57.29 4.92 43.92 73.75 
Gender  467 0.064 0.245 0 1 
Education 467 2.246 0.793 1 3 
      Control  Variables      Legislative    
fragmentation 467 2.467 0.40 1.71 3.54 
Electoral cycle 467 36.47 18.1 2.9 59.73 
Economic crisis 467 4.943 2.371 0.367 10.979 
Age of democracy 467 11.04 6.67 1 25 
Cabinet reshuffle 467 0.478 0.323 0.04 1 
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Table 2. Multinomial Logit Analysis of Policy Area of Post, Political Context, and Minister Type 
 
 Nonpartisan Copartisan 
Other 
Partisan 
Baseline category vs. Copartisan vs. Nonpartisan 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
High-policy 1.340*** -1.214    
 (0.266) (0.806)    
Political-leverage   1.340*** -1.214 1.079*** 
   (0.266) (0.806) (0.365) 
Low-profile 1.688*** 0.344 -0.348 -1.558** 0.658** 
 (0.299) (0.677) (0.503) (0.776) (0.289) 
Legislative support -8.048** -10.64*** 8.048** 5.611 13.78 
 (3.608) (3.794) (3.608) (4.321) (9.341) 
High-policy x   5.033***    
     Legislative support  (1.645)    
Political-leverage x     5.033***  
     Legislative support    (1.645)  
Low-profile x  2.594  2.439  
     Legislative support  (1.613)  (2.566)  
Legislative fragmentation -2.210*** -2.284*** 2.210*** 2.284*** 5.507*** 
 (0.481) (0.468) (0.481) (0.468) (0.939) 
Electoral cycle 0.004 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.043 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.107) 
Economic crisis -0.308* -0.301 0.308* 0.301 0.629*** 
 (0.185) (0.189) (0.185) (0.189) (0.100) 
Age of democracy 0.194 0.198 -0.194 -0.198 -0.316 
 (0.487) (0.494) (0.487) (0.494) (0.906) 
Cabinet reshuffle 0.162 0.192 -0.162 -0.192 0.661 
 (0.199) (0.197) (0.199) (0.197) (0.717) 
Constant 11.65** 13.16** -12.99** -11.94* -30.63*** 
 (5.713) (5.681) (5.559) (6.095) (10.62) 
Log-likelihood -287.66 -285.27 -287.66 -285.27 -287.66 
Observations 467 467 467 467 335 
Number of administrations 5 5 5 5 5 
Notes: Dependent variables: 1 if minister is nonpartisan, copartisan or other partisan.  
Baseline categories: political-leverage or high-policy post, Roh Tae-woo administration. Robust standard errors 
clustered on administration in parentheses.  
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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Figure 1. Marginal Effect of High-policy and Political-leverage Posts and Predicted Probability 
of Nonpartisan and Copartisan Appointments 
 
 
    1.1. Nonpartisan Appointments                                 1.2. Copartisan Appointments 
  
Note: dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals.  
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Table 3. Logit Analysis of Ministers' Backgrounds and Policy Area of Post 
 High-policy Political-leverage 
 All Ministers 
Nonpartisans 
Only All Ministers 
Copartisans 
Only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Hometown 0.573*** 0.753*** -0.240 -0.244 
 (0.141) (0.228) (0.417) (0.909) 
Legislative Experience -0.028 -0.075 0.106*** 0.047 
 (0.030) (0.236) (0.026) (0.037) 
Age 0.072*** 0.026 -0.091*** -0.110 
 (0.016) (0.022) (0.029) (0.073) 
Gender -1.656* -1.498 2.309*** 1.798* 
 (0.909) (0.969) (0.615) (0.996) 
Education -0.401** -0.584*** -0.185 -0.245 
 (0.172) (0.207) (0.209) (0.190) 
Legislative support 0.615 1.154 -4.503*** -0.572 
 (0.920) (0.807) (1.285) (3.069) 
Legislative fragmentation 0.021 -0.143 -0.535 -0.963 
 (0.191) (0.248) (0.462) (0.616) 
Electoral cycle -0.035 -0.082*** 0.001 -0.073* 
 (0.032) (0.024) (0.035) (0.039) 
Economic crisis 0.035 -0.037 -0.099* -0.174** 
 (0.038) (0.109) (0.060) (0.073) 
Age of democracy -0.488 -1.072*** 0.248 -0.713 
 (0.401) (0.360) (0.487) (0.464) 
Cabinet reshuffle -0.066 -0.235 -0.0003 -0.200 
 (0.223) (0.384) (0.414) (0.460) 
Constant -2.099 5.205* 8.510 15.40*** 
 (2.961) (2.825) (5.454) (5.108) 
Log-likelihood -272.17 -186.49 -234.75 -81.05 
Observations 467 317 467 132 
Number of administrations 5 5 5 5 
Notes: Dependent variables: 1 if minister holds a high-policy or a political-leverage post.  
Baseline category: Roh Tae-woo administration. Robust standard errors clustered on administration  in parentheses.  
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
 
 
 
